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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal presents two questions of first impression.  
First, we consider whether the general criminal venue 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3238, applies when a defendant 
commits part of his offense inside the United States.  Second, 
we determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and (f)(1), which 
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together criminalize noncommercial illicit sexual conduct 
outside the United States, is a valid exercise of Congress‟s 
power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United 
States Constitution (the Foreign Commerce Clause). 
I 
On November 25, 2005, Thomas Pendleton boarded a 
plane in New York City and flew to Hamburg, Germany.  Six 
months after his arrival in Germany, Pendleton sexually 
molested a fifteen-year-old boy.  German authorities arrested 
Pendleton, and a jury in Hamburg found him guilty of 
“engaging in sexual acts with a person incapable of 
resistance.”  After serving nineteen months in a German 
prison, Pendleton returned to the United States, where he was 
arrested and indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of 
Delaware on one count of engaging in noncommercial illicit 
sexual conduct in a foreign place, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(c) and (f)(1). 
Adopted in 2003 as part of the Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act (the PROTECT Act), § 2423(c) provides: “Any United 
States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who 
travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual 
conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”  The statute 
defines “illicit sexual conduct” in two ways: (1) “a sexual act 
(as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of 
age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual 
act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States;” or (2) “any commercial sex act (as 
defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2423(f).  Pendleton was indicted under the first 
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subpart of § 2423(f), which criminalizes noncommercial sex 
with a minor. 
Pendleton moved to dismiss the indictment, 
challenging Congress‟s authority to regulate noncommercial 
activity outside the United States under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  The District Court denied Pendleton‟s motion, 
holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) was a valid exercise of 
Congress‟s power to regulate the “channels” of foreign 
commerce.
1
  See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 
(9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he phrase „travels in foreign commerce‟ 
unequivocally establishes that Congress specifically invoked 
the Foreign Commerce Clause.”).  The District Court also 
held that Pendleton‟s due process claim was foreclosed by our 
decision in United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 
1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).
2
 
                                                 
1
 The legislative history of the PROTECT Act does not 
include a statement regarding the source of Congress‟s 
authority to enact § 2423(c).  See generally H.R. REP. NO. 
108-66, at 51, reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 686 (Apr. 
9, 2003).  However, the language of § 2423(c) was adopted 
verbatim from an earlier bill—the Sex Tourism Prohibition 
Improvement Act of 2002—which relied on the Foreign 
Commerce Clause as the basis for its constitutional authority.  
See H.R. REP. NO. 525, at 5, 2002 WL 1376220, at *5 (June 
24, 2002). 
2
 Pendleton asks us to reexamine Martinez-Hidalgo‟s 
holding that no due process violation occurs when Congress 
criminalizes conduct abroad that is “condemned universally 
by law-abiding nations.”  Id. at 156.  We will not do so 
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Following a two-day jury trial, Pendleton was 
convicted of engaging in illicit sexual conduct in Germany in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), and he was sentenced to 
thirty years in prison.
3
  At the close of the Government‟s case, 
Pendleton moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), claiming that he should 
have been tried in the Eastern District of New York.  The 
District Court denied the motion, holding that venue was 
proper in the District of Delaware because Pendleton was 
arrested there following his return to the United States.  
United States v. Pendleton, 2010 WL 427230, at *6 (D. Del. 
Feb. 2, 2010). 
                                                                                                             
because a panel of this Court has no authority to overrule a 
precedential opinion of the Court.  See Mariana v. Fisher, 
338 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2003). 
3
 Pendleton also was sentenced to a concurrent term of 
ten years in prison for failing to register as a sex offender, in 
violation of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006.  See United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Pendleton was first convicted of sexually abusing 
children in Michigan in 1981 and was sentenced to 24 months 
probation.  In 1993, a New Jersey jury found Pendleton guilty 
of various sex crimes against a 12-year-old boy and he was 
sentenced to seven years in prison.  About three years after 
his release from prison, Pendleton traveled to Latvia and was 
convicted there for sex crimes against two children, ages 9 
and 13.  A little over a year after Pendleton was released from 
a Latvian prison he committed the offense at issue in this 
case. 
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Pendleton timely appealed the District Court‟s 
judgment of sentence and seeks reversal for two reasons:  (1) 
venue was improper in the District of Delaware; and (2) the 
“noncommercial” prong of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) is facially 
unconstitutional.  We consider each argument in turn. 
II 
Jurisdiction lies over Pendleton‟s appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582, and we exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s venue determination.  United 
States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328-30 (3d Cir. 2002). 
As a defendant in a criminal trial, Pendleton has a 
constitutional right to be tried in the district where his crime 
was committed.  Id. at 329 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI and 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3).  Congress may fix jurisdiction 
in any district where a “crucial element” of the crime is 
performed.  Id.  When Congress has “not indicate[d] where it 
consider[s] the place of committing the crime to be,” we 
determine jurisdiction “from the nature of the crime alleged 
and the location of the act or acts constituting it.”  United 
States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 n.1 (1999) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  When the 
crime consists of distinct acts occurring in different places, 
venue is proper where any part of the crime occurs.  Id. 
(citing United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77 (1916)). 
Although the PROTECT Act contains no express 
venue provision, Pendleton argues that Congress fixed venue 
for all crimes involving “transportation in foreign commerce” 
only in those districts where foreign travel commenced.  For 
this proposition, Pendleton cites 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), which 
reads in relevant part: 
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Any offense involving the use of the mails, 
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, 
or the importation of an object or person into 
the United States is a continuing offense and, 
except as otherwise expressly provided by 
enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and 
prosecuted in any district from, through, or into 
which such commerce, mail matter, or imported 
object or person moves. 
Because he boarded the plane to Germany in the 
Eastern District of New York, Pendleton claimed jurisdiction 
would have been proper only in that district.  The District 
Court disagreed, writing that “the PROTECT Act contains no 
directive as to the appropriate venue for the prosecution of 
those charged under its provisions.”  Consequently, the Court 
relied on Rodriguez-Moreno‟s two-pronged approach to 
determine venue in this case.  Pendleton, 2010 WL 427230, at 
*6.  This was not error. 
Contrary to Pendleton‟s argument, § 3237(a) does not 
include a mandatory venue provision.  Rather, the statute 
instructs that offenses involving interstate or foreign 
transportation “may be inquired of and prosecuted . . . in the 
district from . . . which such commerce . . . moves.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Government is not 
statutorily barred from prosecuting Pendleton in another 
district if it can show that a portion of his offense was 
committed there.  Moreover, the Constitution does not 
“„command a single exclusive venue.‟”  United States v. 
Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United 
States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985)).  “„The 
[c]onstitution requires only that the venue chosen be 
determined from the nature of the crime charged as well as 
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from the location of the act or acts constituting it, and that it 
not be contrary to an explicit policy underlying venue law.‟”  
Id. (quoting Reed, 773 F.2d at 480). 
 Where, as here, Congress has not designated the venue 
in the relevant criminal statute, we employ the two-pronged 
approach set forth in Rodriguez-Moreno.  See 526 U.S. at 
279.  “A court must initially identify the conduct constituting 
the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the 
location of the commission of the criminal acts.”  Id.  To 
identify which conduct “constitutes the offense,” we look to 
Pendleton‟s crime of conviction, which provides: 
Any United States citizen or alien admitted for 
permanent residence who travels in foreign 
commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual 
conduct with another person shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 
years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).  The crime of conviction thus comprises 
three elements: (1) being a United States citizen or permanent 
resident; (2) traveling in foreign commerce; and (3) engaging 
in illicit sexual conduct.  See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1105 (finding 
that an American citizen who traveled in foreign commerce to 
Cambodia and engaged in commercial sex acts with underage 
boys could be prosecuted under § 2423(c)). 
 Of these three elements, we agree with the District 
Court that “engaging in illicit sexual conduct” is the most 
critical to § 2423(c).  Indeed, the title of the offense—
“Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places”—
describes only this conduct.  Moreover, while travel in 
foreign commerce is an element of § 2423(c), the crime itself 
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is not complete until a person engages in illicit sex.  In this 
regard, § 2423(c) is unlike the crime of “[t]ravel with intent to 
engage in illicit sexual conduct,” defined in § 2423(b), which 
is complete as soon as one begins to travel with the intent to 
engage in a sex act with a minor.  See United States v. 
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We find . 
. . that the criminal act under § 2423(b) is foreign travel with 
criminal intent; and thus, the offense is complete even if the 
illicit intent is never realized.”).  Although § 2423(c) targets 
the same individuals as does § 2423(b)—namely, persons 
traveling in commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit 
sex—it does so by focusing the court‟s attention on the 
defendant‟s actual conduct in the foreign nation.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 108-66, at 51 (explaining that Congress enacted § 
2423(c) so “the government would only have to prove that the 
defendant engaged in illicit sexual conduct with a minor 
while in a foreign country.”).  Thus, the locus delicti of § 
2423(c) is the place where the illicit sex occurs, and not—as 
is the case with § 2423(b)—where the intent to engage in the 
illicit conduct is formed. 
Because the crux of Pendleton‟s offense was 
“committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of any . . . district,” the 
District Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3238 was the controlling 
venue provision.  Section 3238 provides that an offense 
“begun or committed” outside the United States “shall be 
[prosecuted] in the district in which the offender . . . is 
arrested.”  Pendleton argues that § 3238 does not apply to him 
because part of his offense occurred in the Eastern District of 
New York and the title of § 3238 describes only those 
“offenses not committed in any district.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  This argument has some persuasive force, as two of 
our sister courts of appeals have held that “[s]ection 3238 
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does not apply unless the offense was committed entirely on 
the high seas or outside the United States.”  United States v. 
Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 351 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United States v. 
Perlitz, 728 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D. Conn. 2010) (stating in dicta 
that § 3238 cannot apply, “by its terms,” to a § 2423(c) 
offense because “an essential conduct element” of the 
offense, i.e., foreign travel, occurs within a district of the 
United States). 
On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that § 3238 applies even 
when some of a defendant‟s offense conduct takes place in 
the United States.  See, e.g., United States v. Levy Auto Parts, 
787 F.2d 946, 950-952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 
(1986) (finding venue proper under § 3238 when conspiracy 
was “essentially foreign,” even when some overt acts 
occurred inside the United States); United States v. Erwin, 
602 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1071 (1980) (“That venue may also be appropriate in another 
district will not divest venue properly established under § 
3238.”); see also United States v. Bin Laden, 146 F. Supp. 2d 
373, 381 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (criticizing the Second 
Circuit‟s narrow reading of § 3238 in Gilboe as “myopic” and 
“directly in conflict with the clear language of the statute,” 
and noting that the decision “has never been favorably cited 
or relied upon” by district courts in the Second Circuit). 
Although the title of § 3238 includes only “offenses 
not committed in any district,” it is a “well-settled rule of 
statutory interpretation that titles and section headings cannot 
limit the plain meaning of statutory text where that text is 
clear.”  M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344 
F.3d 335, 348 (3d Cir. 2003).  Here, the plain language of § 
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3238 supports the Fourth and Fifth Circuits‟ interpretation of 
the statute.  Section 3238 applies, by its terms, to any offense 
“begun or committed” outside the United States.  Pendleton 
would have us read the term “committed” to mean “wholly 
committed.”  But this cannot be correct, because crimes that 
are “wholly committed” outside the United States are, by 
definition, “begun” abroad.  For the term “committed” to 
have independent meaning, it must refer to crimes that begin 
inside the United States but that are in their essence 
committed abroad.  See Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 
137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen interpreting a statute, 
courts should endeavor to give meaning to every word which 
Congress used and therefore should avoid an interpretation 
which renders an element of the language superfluous.”). 
Here, although Pendleton‟s offense began when he 
initiated foreign travel by boarding a plane bound for 
Germany in the Eastern District of New York, he 
“committed” the offense when he engaged in an illicit sex act 
in Germany.  Because Pendleton‟s criminal conduct was 
“essentially foreign,”  Levy Auto Parts, 787 F.2d at 950, the 
District Court did not err in applying § 3238 to hold that 
venue was proper in the district of arrest. 
III 
Having found that venue was proper in Delaware, we 
turn to Pendleton‟s substantive claim, namely, his assertion 
that the “noncommercial prong” of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) is 
facially unconstitutional.  Pendleton‟s constitutional claim is 
subject to plenary review.  United States v. Singletary, 268 
F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2001).  Because Pendleton raises a 
facial challenge, we will invalidate the statute only if we find 
“that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act 
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would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of 
its applications.”  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court has 
noted that a facial challenge is the “most difficult challenge to 
mount successfully.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987). 
A 
The Constitution authorizes Congress “to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3.  In the early days of the Republic, the Supreme Court 
defined “commerce” broadly to include “every species of 
commercial intercourse” between two parties.  Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 193-94 (1824).  More recently, the 
Supreme Court has recognized “three general categories of 
regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under 
its commerce power.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 
(2005).  These include: (1) the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and 
(3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.  In its pathmarking decision in 
Lopez, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute 
criminalizing the possession of a firearm in a school zone 
because it did not fall within one of the three aforementioned 
categories.  Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the 
Court struck down portions of the Violence Against Women 
Act on similar grounds.  529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“The 
concern . . . that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to 
completely obliterate the Constitution‟s distinction between 
national and local authority seems well founded.”). 
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The three-category framework outlined in Lopez and 
Morrison applies, on its face, to statutes enacted pursuant to 
the Interstate Commerce Clause.  The Supreme Court has yet 
to determine whether this framework applies to cases 
involving Congress‟s power to regulate pursuant to the 
Foreign Commerce Clause.  Early opinions of the Court 
suggest that the three subparts of the Commerce Clause 
should be interpreted similarly.  Notably, in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that “commerce, as 
the word is used in the constitution, is a unit . . . [and] it must 
carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain 
a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which 
alters it.”  22 U.S. at 194; see also Reno v. Bossier Parish 
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000) (“refus[ing] to adopt a 
construction that would attribute different meanings to the 
same phrase in the same sentence, depending upon which 
object it is modifying”); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three 
Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence 
Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2003) (“In practice, 
we have three different Commerce Clauses when text and 
history indicate that we ought to have but one.”). 
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall‟s statement in 
Gibbons, the three subclauses of Article 1, § 8, cl. 3 have 
acquired markedly different meanings over time.  Whereas 
the Interstate Commerce Clause has been constrained by state 
sovereignty concerns, see, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615, 
the Indian Commerce Clause has been interpreted so broadly 
as to grant Congress “plenary and exclusive” authority to 
regulate nearly every aspect of Indian life.  United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citing United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978)); see also Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) 
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(“While the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with 
maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence 
of implementing federal legislation, the central function of the 
Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary 
power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”). 
The Foreign Commerce Clause likewise has “followed 
its own distinct evolutionary path,” Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113, 
having been used primarily as a tool to limit the ability of the 
several states to intervene in matters affecting international 
trade.  See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
512 U.S. 298 (1994); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Antilles Cement Corp. v. 
Acevedo Vila, 408 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005).  For example, in 
Japan Line, the Supreme Court held that California could not 
impose an ad valorem tax on Japanese shipping containers 
that were stored temporarily in the state because the scheme 
could restrict the federal government‟s ability to “speak with 
one voice” in foreign affairs.  441 U.S. at 448.  Recognizing 
that the purpose of the Foreign Commerce Clause was to 
establish national uniformity over commerce with foreign 
nations,
4
 the Court held that, “[a]lthough the Constitution, 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, this was a principal reason for assembling the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787.  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 225 
(Johnson, J., concurring) (quoting the preamble of James 
Madison‟s draft resolution at the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention, stating that “the relative situation of the United 
States has been found, on trial, to require uniformity in their 
commercial regulations, as the only effectual policy for 
obtaining, in the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation of 
privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects of such 
nations in the ports of the United States”); see also Michelin 
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Art. I § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce 
„with foreign Nations‟ and „among the several States‟ in 
parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended 
the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.”  
Id. 
Although jurisprudence on the so-called “dormant” 
Foreign Commerce Clause is well-developed, “[c]ases 
involving the reach of . . . congressional authority to regulate 
our citizens‟ conduct abroad are few and far between.”  
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1102.  Courts have consistently held that 
the Foreign Commerce Clause requires a jurisdictional nexus 
“with” the United States, see, e.g., U.S. v. Weingarten, 632 
F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that a person who travels from 
one foreign nation to another to commit an illicit sex act may 
not be punished pursuant to Congress‟s foreign commerce 
power); Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 
1983) (“The Federal Aviation Act does not apply to the 
activities of a foreign carrier operating between two foreign 
points without contact in the United States.”), but there is 
precious little case law on how to establish the requisite link 
                                                                                                             
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976) (“[A] 
compelling reason for the calling of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 . . . was the fact that the Articles [of 
Confederation] essentially left the individual States free to 
burden commerce both among themselves and with foreign 
countries very much as they pleased.”); United States v. The 
William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 620 (D. Mass. 1808) (“It is well 
understood, that the depressed state of American commerce, 
and complete experience of the inefficiency of state 
regulations, to apply a remedy, were among the great, 
procuring causes of the federal constitution.”). 
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to commercial interests in the United States.  In the absence 
of Supreme Court precedent on the issue, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the Lopez 
framework—which developed to “reconcile[] . . . the 
conflicting claims of state and national power”—has little 
analytical value in the Foreign Commerce Clause context.  
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1118.  Rather than applying Lopez‟s three-
part framework to determine whether a statute has a 
“constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce,” the 
Ninth Circuit proposed a “global, commonsense approach,” 
which considers “whether the statute bears a rational 
relationship to Congress‟s authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.”5  Id. 
                                                 
5
 The Ninth Circuit in Clark claims to borrow this 
“rational basis” test from the Supreme Court‟s holding in 
Gonzales v. Raich.  See 545 U.S. at 5 (holding that Congress 
had a “rational basis” for believing that intrastate possession 
and manufacture of marijuana had a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce).  As the dissent in Clark rightly notes, 
however, the “rational basis” analysis in Raich went to 
Congress‟s “substantial effects” determination.  The Supreme 
Court has articulated several factors to be weighed in 
determining whether an activity “substantially affects” 
interstate commerce: (1) whether the regulated activity is 
economic in nature; (2) whether the statute contains an 
“express jurisdictional element” linking its scope in some 
way to interstate commerce; (3) whether Congress made 
express findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity 
on interstate commerce; and (4) attenuation of the link 
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.  See 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12. 
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The Government urges us to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach to the Foreign Commerce Clause.  Although we 
agree with Clark that the Interstate Commerce Clause 
developed to address “unique federalism concerns” that are 
absent in the foreign commerce context, we are hesitant to 
dispose of Lopez‟s “time-tested” framework without further 
guidance from the Supreme Court.  See id. at 1119 (Ferguson, 
J., dissenting).  The Supreme Court has not yet held that 
Congress has greater authority to regulate activity outside the 
United States than it does within its borders; in fact, the 
language used to describe its extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
quite similar to that used in Lopez.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795 (1993) (recognizing 
that the Sherman Antitrust Act applies extraterritorially, and 
stating that a jurisdictional nexus exists when “foreign 
conduct was meant to produce and did in fact produce some 
substantial effect in the United States”).  In any case, we need 
not reach the fundamental question of whether the Supreme 
Court will adopt the Ninth Circuit’s broad articulation of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause because, as we shall explain, § 
2423(c) is a valid congressional enactment under the 
narrower standard articulated in Lopez. 
                                                                                                             
The “rational basis” standard articulated by the Ninth 
Circuit in Clark does not consider any of these factors.  
Rather, its open-ended inquiry seems to borrow more heavily 
from the Supreme Court‟s pre-Lopez jurisprudence, which 
held that a court‟s “investigation . . . end[s]” once it 
determines that “legislators . . . have a rational basis for 
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the 
protection of commerce.”  Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 303-04 (1964). 
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B 
 “[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of 
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has 
been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.”   
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
256 (1964) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
491 (1917)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (describing 
the Court‟s holding in Lopez, and noting that that although 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) contains “no express jurisdictional element 
which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm 
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with 
or effect on interstate commerce, . . . [s]uch a jurisdictional 
element [would have] establish[ed] that the enactment is in 
pursuance of Congress‟s regulation of interstate commerce”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Unlike 
Congressional authority to regulate activities affecting 
interstate commerce under the third category in Lopez, 
Congress‟s authority to regulate the channels of commerce is 
not confined to regulations with an economic purpose or 
impact.  See, e.g., Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491 (criminalizing 
the interstate transportation of a woman or girl for 
prostitution); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 
(1971) (banning the interstate shipment of kidnapped 
persons); United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049-51 
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the International Parental 
Kidnapping Crime Act regulates the channels of foreign 
commerce by prohibiting the removal or retention of a child 
outside the United States “with intent to obstruct the lawful 
exercise of parental rights”). 
In United States v. Tykarsky, we held that 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b), which criminalizes interstate travel with intent to 
engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, is a valid 
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exercise of Congress‟s power to regulate the channels of 
commerce.  446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006); accord United 
States v. Hawkins, 513 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam); United States v. Buttrick, 432 F.3d 373, 374 (1st Cir. 
2005); Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205-207.  Pendleton attempts to 
distinguish Tykarsky by noting that unlike § 2423(b), § 
2423(c) includes no intent requirement.  Citing United States 
v. Rodia for the proposition that “[t]he mere presence of a 
jurisdictional element . . . does not in and of itself insulate a 
statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause,” 
Pendleton claims the District Court should have inquired 
whether “the jurisdictional component in this case limits the 
statute to items that have an explicit connection with, or effect 
upon, [foreign] commerce.”  194 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(finding that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)‟s jurisdictional 
requirement that materials like film and cameras move in 
interstate commerce “is only tenuously related to the ultimate 
activity regulated: intrastate possession of child 
pornography”).  No such connection exists here, Pendleton 
argues, because his conviction under § 2423(c) would stand 
even if he traveled through the channels of commerce for an 
entirely lawful purpose and only later formed the intent to 
engage in illicit sex with a minor.  Contrary to Pendleton‟s 
assertions, however, a statute need not include an element of 
mens rea to trigger the first prong of Lopez. 
In United States v. Shenandoah, we upheld portions of 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1) and (2) and 42 U.S.C. § 
14072(i)(1), making it illegal for a sex offender to fail to 
properly register after traveling in interstate commerce.  595 
F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2010); accord United States v. Ambert, 
561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. May, 
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535 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2008).  Like the provision at issue 
here (§ 2423(c)), SORNA does not require that a sex offender 
intend, at the time of travel, to later violate federal 
registration requirements.  Nor does SORNA require the 
Government to demonstrate a temporal connection between 
the time of travel and a sex offender’s failure to register.  
United States v. Husted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56662, at *9 
(W.D. Okla. June 29, 2007) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-218 
(Sept. 7, 2005)) (“[T]he legislative history of the statute 
shows Congress chose not to incorporate a temporal 
requirement but, instead, intended to encompass all sex 
offenders.”).  For instance, a “tier I sex offender” who moves 
from one state to another and, years later, violates SORNA’s 
provisions by failing to update his information on an annual 
basis can be convicted under the statute.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250(a)(1); see Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 
(2010) (observing in dicta that “[a] sequential reading [of the 
statute] . . . helps to assure a nexus between a defendant’s 
interstate travel and his failure to register as a sex offender”).6 
                                                 
6
 In this respect, SORNA‟s “failure to register” 
provision is similar to the federal felon-in-possession law, 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g), enacted pursuant to Congress‟s authority 
under the Commerce Clause.  Section 922(g) makes it 
unlawful for a felon to “possess in or affecting commerce, 
any firearm or ammunition . . . which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”  In Singletary 
v. United States, we held that the transport of a weapon 
through the channels of interstate commerce—however 
remote in the distant past—provides a sufficient jurisdictional 
nexus to satisfy Lopez‟s first prong.  268 F.3d 196, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 341 U.S. 
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Nevertheless, SORNA was specifically enacted to 
address “one of the biggest problems in our current sex 
offender registry,” 152 CONG. REC. S8012-14 (daily ed. July 
20, 2006), 2005 WL 2034118, namely, sex offenders who go 
“missing” from the national registry by moving from one 
state to another, H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(1) (2005), 2005 WL 
2210642.  Finding that “over 10,000 sex offenders, or nearly 
one-fifth in the Nation . . . are „missing,‟” id., Congress chose 
to regulate the behavior of all sex offenders who cross state 
lines.  Because Congress invoked its authority to regulate “the 
use of interstate commerce to facilitate forms of immorality,” 
Shenandoah, 95 F.3d at 161 (citing Brooks v. United States, 
267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925)), it was not obliged to include an 
express intent or temporal element in its definition of the 
offense.  Accord United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (summarily rejecting defendant‟s Commerce 
Clause argument, noting that the defendant “must in the heat 
of argument have forgotten the Mann Act”); United States v. 
Hann, 574 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (“[Lopez] 
encompasses § 2250(a) because the statute regulates sex 
offenders who travel in interstate commerce even though the 
threat Congress was attempting to address—failure to register 
as a sex offender—is an intrastate activity.”) (citations 
omitted). 
The same rationale applies to Pendleton‟s case.  Just as 
SORNA‟s “failure to report” provision was intended to 
prevent convicted sex offenders from “us[ing] the channels of 
interstate commerce in evading a State‟s reach,” Carr, 130 S. 
                                                                                                             
563, 564 (1977)).  Similarly, under § 2423(c), a person‟s 
travel through foreign commerce continues to provide a link 
to his illicit sexual conduct long after his travel is complete. 
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Ct. at 2238, Congress enacted § 2423(c) to close “significant 
loopholes in the law that persons who travel to foreign 
countries seeking sex with children are currently using to 
their advantage in order to avoid prosecution,”  H.R. REP. NO. 
107-525, at 3 (summarizing the purpose of adopting language 
similar to § 2423(c) in the Sex Tourism Prohibition 
Improvement Act).  Specifically, Congress found that 
American citizens were using the channels of foreign 
commerce to travel to countries where “dire poverty and . . . 
lax enforcement” would allow them to “escape prosecution” 
for their crimes of child sexual abuse.  148 CONG. REC. 3884; 
id. at 3885 (“Sadly, we know that many Americans go abroad 
to prey on young girls in other countries because laws 
protecting women are very weak, non-existent, or not 
enforced.”); H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 4 (“According to the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, child-
sex tourism is a major component of the worldwide sexual 
exploitation of children and is increasing.  There are more 
than 100 web sites devoted to promoting teenage commercial 
sex in Asia alone.”); see also 109 H.R. 2012, 109th Cong. § 2 
(2005) (“The United Nations estimates that sex trafficking, 
including sex tourism, generates approximately 
$5,000,000,000 a year in revenues.  There are a number of 
United States-based companies that overtly and explicitly 
facilitate sex tours, often involving the sexual exploitation of 
children.  According to some estimates, up to 1/4 of 
international sex tourists are American.”). 
Members of Congress also expressed concern that § 
2423(b) would not adequately deter child-sex tourists because 
prosecutors were having an “extremely difficult” time 
“proving intent in such cases.”  148 CONG. REC. 3884 (stating 
that intent is particularly “difficult to prove without direct 
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arrangement booked through obvious child sex-tour 
networks.”).  This, in turn, “creat[ed] a loophole in the law for 
men who go abroad to have sex with minors, which in the 
United States is considered statutory rape.”  Id.  Section 
2423(c) was enacted to close the enforcement gap and to 
“send a message to those who go to foreign countries to 
exploit children that no one can abuse a child with impunity.”  
Id.  Thus, as it did with SORNA, Congress enacted § 2423(c) 
to regulate persons who use the channels of commerce to 
circumvent local laws that criminalize child abuse and 
molestation.  And just as Congress may cast a wide net to 
stop sex offenders from traveling in interstate commerce to 
evade state registration requirements, so too may it attempt to 
prevent sex tourists from using the channels of foreign 
commerce to abuse children.  Id.; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1116 
(“Congress legitimately exercises its authority to regulate the 
channels of commerce where a crime committed on foreign 
soil is necessarily tied to travel in foreign commerce, even 
where the actual use of the channels has ceased.”); N. Am. Co. 
v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (“Congress may impose 
relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the 
channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels 
will not become the means of promoting or spreading evil, 
whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.”). 
In sum, because the jurisdictional element in § 2423(c) 
has an “express connection” to the channels of foreign 
commerce,
 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, we hold that it is a 
valid exercise of Congress‟s power under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.
7
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 Having found that the statute is constitutional under 
the first prong of Lopez, we need not address Pendleton‟s 
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IV 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s judgment of conviction and sentence. 
                                                                                                             
contention that § 2423(f)(1) does not survive Morrison‟s 
stringent “substantial effects” test.  See United States v. 
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e need not 
proceed to an analysis of Lopez‟s third category when 
Congress clearly has the power to regulate such an activity 
under the first two.”); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 
922 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding SORNA under the first and 
second prongs of Lopez, and thus finding that it “need not 
address [the defendant‟s] contention SORNA was not 
accompanied by findings that the activity in question exerted 
a „substantial influence on interstate commerce‟ similar to 
those in support of the Controlled Substances Act regulation 
considered and upheld in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005)”). 
